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KADI: KING-SLAYER OR KING-MAKER? 
 
THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF DECISION-MAKING POWER BETWEEN  
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND COURTS 
 
Devika Hovell* 
 
‘A King is not legally obliged to lay down general rules and obey them, but if he has an iota of 
political sense, he will do so.’ 
- Jean Bodin, IV, 4, 486 
 
This note analyses the twelve-year span of the Kadi litigation in the 
European courts. The litigation raises the textbook question of the 
relationship between international and municipal legal orders, yet 
demonstrates that it is high time to move the description of this relationship 
beyond the orthodox yet outdated monist/dualist dichotomy that was seen 
to provide the answer in less complicated times. This note examines the 
different approaches taken at the three key phases of the litigation: the 
‘supremacy’ position adopted by the Court of First Instance in 2005, the 
‘subversive’ approach of the European Court of Justice in 2008 and the 
‘subsidiarity’ position of the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2013. 
Ultimately, the note invites attention to the ‘Solange equivalence’ approach 
taken by the Advocates-General and argues that this strikes the best 
balance in normative terms for an enduring approach to power-sharing 
between legal orders.  
 
Keywords: Kadi; Security Council; Sanctions; United Nations; European Union; international law  
 
The question of power-sharing is a familiar battleground in the United Kingdom. 
The scope of devolution has rarely been so contested and the extent of the future 
transfer of sovereignty to the European Union hangs in the balance. A power-
sharing arrangement that has received less attention is the allocation of decision-
making power between the UK and the increasing array of international 
institutions assuming decision-making power in relation to UK nationals and 
interests. Prominent among these institutions is the UN Security Council. The 
Security Council is not accustomed to sharing power. Throughout its short 
history, the Security Council has staunchly resisted limitations to its power and 
flaunted its unchecked discretion as necessary for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. This note analyses the twelve-year span of the 
Kadi litigation,1 which has posed the greatest challenge to date to the Security 
Council’s assessment of sanctions decision-making as its exclusive bailiwick. For 
both the UK and the Security Council, the Kadi case law signals a loss of 
                                                        
*
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1
 The litigation comprises four court decisions and two opinions of Advocates General: Kadi v Council 
and Commission [2005] ECR II-0000 (‘CFI Kadi’); Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Kadi v 
Council of the European Union, 16 January 2008; Kadi v Council of the European Union [2008] ECR 
I-0000 (‘ECJ Kadi’); Kadi v European Commission [2010] EUECJ; Opinion of Advocate General Bot. 
European Commission and Council v Kadi, 19 March 2013; European Commission & Council v Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi [2013] ECR not yet reported (‘CJEU Kadi’). 
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monopoly over decision-making authority over individuals and international 
security respectively, and confirms the plurality of the modern concept of law.2 
 
When the Security Council decided on a revolutionary shift in sanctions policy – 
targeting sanctions directly against individuals rather than in blanket fashion 
against states – it elected against building in any due process ‘limitations’ on its 
decision-making power. A decade of criticism about due process deficiencies in 
sanctions decision-making followed, though made little impact on Council policy, 
notwithstanding its source in a variety of influential institutions including the 
General Assembly,3 the UN Secretary-General,4 the UN Special Rapporteur on 
human rights and counter-terrorism5 and the UN Human Rights Committee.6 In 
this respect, the Kadi litigation was a game-changer. Possessing the capacity to 
open an EU-sized hole in the sanctions net, the European courts were able to 
force the Council to engage in a consideration of power-sharing in a way that 
other bodies could not. In practical terms, the Kadi case was undoubtedly the 
single most important factor in persuading the Security Council finally to 
undertake meaningful procedural reform, with the establishment of the Office of 
the UN Ombudsperson. 7  In theoretical terms, the principal effect of the 
judgments and opinions was to propose a range of solutions to the tangle 
between legal orders in an increasingly complex global environment. It is not 
that the Kadi litigation provides a definitive answer.8 Rather, considered as a 
whole, the Kadi litigation is an excellent case study through which to examine 
various approaches to the relationship between legal orders, in particular the 
role of municipal courts in Security Council decision-making, and one that merits 
continuing reflection. Ultimately, the litigation tackles the textbook question of 
                                                        
2 Matej Avbelj, ‘The case of Mr Kadi and the modern concept of law’ in Matej Avbelj, Filippo 
Fontanelli and Giuseppe Martinico (eds), Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Trial 
(Routledge 2014), 49. 
3 World Summit Outcome document, UN General Assembly Resolution 60(1) (24 October 2005) UN 
Doc A/RES/60/1. 
4 ‘Non-paper of the Secretary General’ referred to in debate on ‘Strengthening international law: rule of 
law and maintenance of peace and security’ (22 June 2006) UN doc S/PV.5474. 
5 M. Scheinin, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
while countering terrorism’ (16 August 2006) UN doc A/61/267. 
6 UN Human Rights Committee, Sayadi and Vinck v Belgium (Communication No 1472/2006, 29 
December 2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006. 
7 UN Security Council resolution 1904 (17 December 2009) UN doc S/RES/1904. See also 
‘Statement of French representative on the adoption of SC Resolutions 1988 and 1989’, UN doc 
S/PV.6557 (2011). 
8
 For other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies that have considered the issue of the relationship between 
Security Council and municipal legal orders, see [European Court of Human Rights] Al-Jedda v United 
Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 789; Nada v. Switzerland (2013) 56 EHRR 18; Al-Dulimi and Montana v 
Switzerland (App No 5809/08), ECHR, 26 November 2013; [UK Supreme Court] Her Majesty’s 
Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 2; Al Jedda v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58; [UN 
Human Rights Committee] Sayadi and Vinck v Belgium (Communication No 1472/2006, 29 December 
2008) UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1472/2006, [10.8]. See in particular Individual opinion (partly 
dissenting) by Sir Nigel Rodley, Ivan Shearer and Iulia Antoanella Motoc, 27; Individual (dissenting) 
opinion of Ruth Wedgewood, 30; Individual opinion of Ivan Shearer, 32. 
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the relationship between international and municipal law (here the relationship 
between Security Council resolutions and EU law), yet demonstrates that it is 
high time to move the description of this relationship beyond the orthodox yet 
outdated monist/dualist dichotomy that was seen to provide the answer in less 
complicated times.9  
 
In the following note, I set out the background to the litigation, then identify the 
different approaches taken at the three key phases of the litigation: the 
‘supremacy’ position adopted by the Court of First Instance in 2005 (CFI Kadi);10 
the ‘subversive’ approach of the European Court of Justice in 2008 (ECJ Kadi)11 
and the ‘subsidiarity’ approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
2013 (CJEU Kadi).12 I then assess the impact of each approach on the legitimacy 
and effectiveness of sanctions decision-making and conclude that none of the 
approaches taken by the European courts form the foundation of an enduring 
normative approach to the relationship between legal orders. Instead, I invite 
attention to the ‘Solange equivalence’ approach taken by the Advocates General 
in Kadi,13 and argue that this strikes the best balance in normative terms.  
 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE KADI LITIGATION 
 
Mr Kadi is a Saudi Arabian businessman and former architect. He was placed on 
the UN sanctions list in 1999 and 2000 as a suspected associate of Osama bin 
Laden’s terror network Al Qaeda. He was 47 at the time, at the height of his 
career. According to Mr Kadi, his listing by the Security Council turned his life 
upside down and consumed his life for the next decade (he was eventually de-
listed at the age of 59 following a successful application to the UN 
Ombudsperson). Mr Kadi has remarked that the idea that the Security Council 
listing had a profound impact on his life is an understatement. Yet though the 
impact of the sanctions was intensely personal, Mr Kadi accuses a very public 
institution for his misfortune. In the course of a presentation at a sanctions 
conference in 2013, Mr Kadi identified ‘denial of the rule of law’ as the source of 
the injustice he faced.14  
 
The key problem in rule-of-law terms is that there was no adequate mechanism 
put in place by the UN Security Council through which Mr Kadi could challenge 
                                                        
9 P. Sales and J. Clement, ‘International Law in Domestic Courts: The Developing Framework’ 
(2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 388 citing R. Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s 
International Law (9th ed, 1992). 
10
 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-0000. 
11
 Kadi v Council of the European Union [2008] ECR I-0000. In 2010, the General Court handed down 
a decision following the 2008 decision of the European Court of Justice: Case T-85/09 Kadi v 
European Commission [2010] EUECJ. Detailed reference will not be made to this decision. 
12
 European Commission & Council v Yassin Abdullah Kadi [2013] ECR not yet reported.  
13
 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro, Kadi v Council of the European Union, 16 January 2008; 
Opinion of Advocate General Bot. European Commission and Council v Kadi, 19 March 2013.  
14
 UCL Workshop, ‘Smarter EU Sanctions?’, University College London, 8 November 2013, 
Presentation by Sheikh Yassin Abdullah Kadi (conference notes with author). 
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his listing by the UN Sanctions Committee. When the Security Council chose to 
adopt its targeted sanctions policy, it rebuffed the UN Office of Legal Counsel’s 
request for assistance, declaring there were ‘no legal issues’ involved in the 
listing or delisting of individuals on sanctions blacklists.15 Indeed, at the time of 
Mr Kadi’s listing, there was no review mechanism at the UN level, with 
individuals forced to rely on their state of nationality to engage in diplomatic 
lobbying of relevant Security Council members on their behalf. As a Saudi 
Arabian national, Mr Kadi had little chance of being de-listed via this route. 
Consequently, Mr Kadi sought to challenge his listing in a number of different 
domestic and regional jurisdictions, including domestic courts in Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, the United States and the EU. It is the case law resulting 
from the litigation before EU courts that has attracted the greatest attention. 
 
 
II. KADI IN THE CFI:  
SUPREMACY AND THE EMPTINESS OF HIERARCHY 
 
On 18 November 2001, Mr Kadi submitted an application to the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) seeking an annulment of the EU regulation implementing the 
Security Council assets freeze against him in the EU. He put forward three 
grounds of annulment alleging a breach of the right to a fair hearing, breach of 
the right to property and breach of the right to effective judicial review.16 As 
their principal argument against these claims, the European Council and 
Commission submitted that they were bound under international law, referring 
in particular to Articles 25 and 103 of the UN Charter, to give effect to Security 
Council resolutions. Moreover, they claimed that European courts were 
precluded from engaging in judicial review of the relevant regulation as this 
‘would be tantamount to indirect and selective judicial review of the mandatory 
measures decided upon by the Security Council…and would be liable to 
undermine one of the foundations of the international order of States established 
after 1945’.17 
 
(a) The Findings 
 
One of the initial questions considered by the CFI was ‘the relationship between 
the legal order under the United Nations and the domestic or Community legal 
order’.18 The CFI identified a ‘rule of primacy’ under customary international law 
of international law over municipal law. More specifically, in the case of Security 
Council resolutions, the CFI recognised that the combined operation of Article 25 
                                                        
15 Confidential communication, 24 January 2006, cited in S. Chesterman, ‘The Spy Who Came In 
From The Cold War: Intelligence and International Law’ (2006) 27 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1071, 1117; Remarks by H. Corell, ‘Is the Security Council Bound by Human 
Rights Law’ (103rd Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington DC, 
27 March 2009). 
16
 CFI Kadi, [59].  
17
 CFI Kadi, [162].  
18
 CFI Kadi, [178].  
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and Article 103 of the UN Charter19 operated to ensure that the obligations of UN 
Member States under Security Council resolutions prevailed over their 
obligations under any other international agreement, including the EC Treaty.20 
It followed that, according to the CFI, ‘Member States may, and indeed must, 
leave unapplied any provision of Community law, whether a provision of 
primary law or a general principle of that law, that raises any impediment to the 
proper performance of their obligations under the Charter of the United 
Nations’.21  
 
The CFI then turned to the question of judicial review, namely whether European 
courts had the power to review the legality of regulations implementing Security 
Council resolutions. The CFI held that, as a corollary of the principles discussed 
in the previous paragraph, the jurisdiction of European Courts was necessarily 
limited. Citing incompatibility with both international and Community law, the 
CFI held that ‘[t]he resolutions of the Security Council at issue fall, in principle, 
outside the ambit of the Court’s judicial review and…the Court has no authority 
to call in question, even indirectly, their lawfulness in the light of Community 
law’.22  
 
Yet this did not put an end to the matter. While European courts had no power to 
review Security Council resolutions against Community law, this did not stop the 
CFI reviewing the compatibility of resolutions with international law. The CFI 
effectively re-styled itself as an agent of the international community and held 
that ‘the Court is empowered to check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the 
resolutions of the Security Council in question with regard to jus cogens, 
understood as the body of higher rules of public international law binding on all 
subjects of international law, including the bodies of the United Nations, and 
from which no derogation is possible’.23 In a statement that most international 
lawyers would agree with, the CFI recognised that there was one limit to the 
binding effect of Security Council resolutions, namely that the Council ‘must 
observe fundamental peremptory provisions of jus cogens’.24 The Court’s next 
steps were more controversial. Examples of jus cogens norms are widely 
recognised to be ‘very, very few in number’.25 There is a notorious level of 
disagreement as to their scope, and significant indeterminacy as to their content. 
Ian Brownlie famously described jus cogens as the Bentley that never leaves the 
                                                        
19
 Under Article 25 of the UN Charter, ‘Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out 
the decisions of the Security Council’. Under Article 103, ‘[i]n the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail’.   
20
 CFI Kadi, [184].  
21
 CFI Kadi, [191]. 
22
 CFI Kadi, [225].  
23
 CFI Kadi, [226]. 
24
 CFI Kadi, [229]. 
25
 R. Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench’ (2006) 55 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 791, 801.  
  Devika Hovell (2016) 79(1) MLR 147 
6 
 
garage.26 Contrary to this accepted narrow view and citing minimal authority, 
the CFI took an expansive reading of jus cogens, essentially putting all human 
rights within that category, including the right to a fair hearing, the right not to 
be arbitrarily deprived of property and the right to an effective remedy.27 
Perhaps unseated by the enormity of this first step, the CFI then took a second 
extraordinary step, holding that there had been no breach of these norms in the 
case in question, despite the fact it had previously been widely accepted that the 
UN sanctions regime fell foul of these due process norms.  
 
(b) Reaction and Analysis: Article 103 as Anachronism 
 
It is perhaps no surprise that the CFI judgment was roundly criticised.28 In 
terms of its approach to the interpretation of applicable international legal and 
human rights norms, it was criticised on the one hand for artificially inflating the 
set of jus cogens norms by which the Security Council could be held to account. 
(Indeed the approach brings to mind the the title to Anthony D’Amato’s 2010 
article, ‘It’s a bird, it’s a plane, it’s jus cogens!’.29) On the other hand it was 
criticised for its anaemic approach to human rights protections, initially in 
declining jurisdiction over individuals caught up in the UN sanctions net and, 
then, by narrowly interpreting the application of international human rights 
principles to the relevant facts. The Court’s approach to the relationship between 
legal orders can be characterised as both monist and hierarchical. The judgment 
rests on the claim that the relevant law derives its validity and authority from its 
source in a Security Council resolution, and that obligations under Security 
Council resolutions prevail over all other legal obligations according to the terms 
                                                        
26 I. Brownlie, ‘Comment’ in J. Weiler and A. Cassese (eds), Change and Stability in International 
Law-Making (Berlin 1988), 108, 110. 
27
 CFI Kadi, [226-229].  
28
 M. Milanović, ‘Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither International Law?’ (2009) 20 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 69, 91, 93; J. Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in J. 
Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University 
Press 2009), 1; C. Eckes, ‘Judicial Review of European Anti-Terrorism Measures – the Yusuf and Kadi 
Judgments of the Court of First Instance’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 74; Piet Eeckhout, 
‘Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights and UN Security Council Resolutions: In Search 
of the Right Fit’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review 183, 195; M. Nettesheim, ‘UN 
Sanctions against Individuals – A Challenge to the Architecture of European Union Governance’ 
(2007) CML Review 567; M. Bulterman, ‘Fundamental Rights and the United Nations Financial 
Sanctions Regime: The Kadi and Yusuf Judgments of the Court of First Instance of the European 
Communities’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 753; A. Vandepoorter, ‘L’application 
communautaire des decisions du Conseil de Sécurité’ (2006) 52 Annuaire francais de droit 
international 102, 122; E. Cannizzaro, ‘A Machiavellian Moment? The UN Security Council and the 
Rule of Law’ (2006) 3 International Organizations Law Review 189, 202; B. Conforti, ‘Decisioni del 
Consiglio disicurezza e diritti fondamentali in una bizarre sentenze del Tribunale communitario di 
primo grado’ (2006) 11 Diritto dell’Unione europea 333, 342; E. Defeis, ‘Targeted sanctions, human 
rights, and the Court of First Instance of the European Community’ (2006) Fordham International Law 
Journal 1449, 1454. 
29
 A. D’Amato, ‘It’s a bird, it’s a plane, it’s jus cogens!’ (1990) 6(1) Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 1. 
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of the EU treaty framework and UN Charter. The mooted jus cogens qualification 
is discarded as a fig-leaf with the CFI’s rather unfortunate interpretation of this 
category both as unusually broad yet seemingly impossible to violate.  
 
Beyond its interpretation of the treaty texts, the CFI’s approach to the 
relationship between legal orders can also be criticised in normative terms. 
Whether deliberately or not, the CFI adopts a command theory of law that is, at 
best, misplaced and, at worst, an abdication of judicial responsibility against the 
backdrop of the broader negotiation of the architecture for global governance of 
which the judgment forms part. The critical reaction to the judgment coupled 
with its lack of influence indicates that continuing attachment to the power of 
Security Council ‘command’ and traditional notions of hierarchy is regarded as 
increasingly misplaced. The only institution that stands to benefit from this 
attachment is the Security Council itself. However, even this can be questioned. 
Despite the dearth of formal legal limitations on the Council, it has become clear 
that the Council’s law-making capacity is not self-sufficient. The Council must 
share power with others and accept limits, if only to secure obedience to its 
commands. There is a growing sense that ‘pillars’ of Security Council supremacy 
such as Articles 25 and 103 are no longer adequate (if they ever were) to secure 
the effective implementation of Security Council resolutions. The view that 
international institutions are manifestly a good thing that can do no wrong, 
whose functions could contribute only to the ‘salvation of mankind’, is the 
perspective of a bygone era.30 It is increasingly recognised that international 
institutions are capable of all manner of missteps, omissions, and sins, including 
in some cases human rights violations.31 The Security Council can no longer 
afford to rely on formal hierarchy, but must ensure that the decision-making 
takes account of widely-held interests and values if it wishes its decisions to 
achieve widespread acceptance and compliance.  
 
The issue is not merely one of legitimacy, but also (linked to this) of 
effectiveness. The Security Council’s decisions will only be effective to the extent 
they gain acceptance among the range of interests affected by its decision-
making. In the sanctions setting, the Security Council is becoming increasingly 
reliant on non-state actors for co-operation, implementation and enforcement of 
its decision-making. If these actors feel sidelined or are otherwise dissatisfied 
with Security Council decision-making, they may seek to undermine the Council’s 
decisions.32 Representatives of private industry, including banks, airlines and 
other representatives of private industry, have the capacity to undermine the 
effectiveness of the sanctions regime if they facilitate offers of employment, 
educational or travel opportunities, decline to freeze funds or actively contribute 
funds to those on sanctions blacklists. Indeed, experience has shown that, even 
where states have formally complied with sanctions measures, elements of civil 
                                                        
30
 N. Singh, Termination of Membership of International Organisations (1958), vii. 
31
 F. Mégret and F. Hoffmann, ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United 
Nations Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’, (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 314. 
32
 M Zürn, ‘Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems’ (2004) 39 Government and Opposition 260, 
283-4. 
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society have engaged in deliberate violations of sanctions decision-making 
where they do not agree with the Council’s decision to list certain individuals.33 
There is a wide perception that sanctions decision-making is unfair and that 
there is a need to recognise a broader system of legal principles by which to 
check their conduct.34 In power-sharing terms, it will strengthen rather than 
weaken Security Council authority if domestic courts are granted a degree of 
authority in checking Security Council decision-making. 
 
III. KADI IN THE ECJ:  
AN ACT OF JUDICIAL SUBVERSION 
In 2008, the European Court of Justice handed down its decision on appeal in the 
Kadi case. As is well known, the ECJ took a directly contrasting approach to the 
CFI, declining to defer to the Security Council and ultimately invalidating the 
regulation giving effect to the relevant Security Council resolution on the basis it 
violated fundamental rights of the European legal order. In terms of its approach 
to the relationship between the European and UN legal orders, the reasoning of 
the ECJ was also directly opposed to that of the CFI. In its findings, it did not so 
much as mention Articles 25 or 103 of the UN Charter. With a vague reference to 
the ‘alleged absolute primacy of the resolutions of the Security Council’, the ECJ 
determined that such a characterization of Security Council resolutions had 
nothing to say about the ‘hierarchy of norms within the Community legal order’ 
and that any such claim to ‘primacy’ could only apply to ‘acts of secondary 
Community law’ and could never authorise any derogation from respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms that form part of the very foundations 
of the Community legal order.35  
 
(a) The Findings 
The Court’s reasoning is a difficult one to pin down in terms of its broader 
approach to the allocation of authority between international and European legal 
orders. At the heart of the decision is the Court’s determination that the EC 
Treaty establishes an ‘autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by 
an international agreement’.36 In contrast to the CFI’s deference to the source of 
the initial decision-making power, namely the Security Council, the Security 
Council attempts to separate the regulation from its source and imagines that it 
is deciding the dispute ‘in the context of the internal and autonomous legal order 
of the Community, within whose ambit the contested regulation falls’.37 By 
amputating the international roots of the regulation, the ECJ emphasises it is not 
                                                        
33
 See, for example, S. Schmemann, ‘A Nation Challenged: Sanctions and Fallout’ New York Times 
(New York 26 January 2002); P. Koring, ‘Federal lawyers argue they have no obligation to bring 
Abdelrazik home’ Globe and Mail (8 May 2009). 
34
 J.E. Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (2005), at 585. 
35 ECJ Kadi, [305], [307]. 
36
 ECJ Kadi, [316]. See also at [282]: ‘an international agreement cannot affect the allocation of powers 
fixed by the [European] Treaties or, consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal system’.  
37
 ECJ Kadi, [317]. 
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engaging in the review of the lawfulness of ‘a resolution adopted by an 
international body’, but rather of ‘the Community act intended to give effect to 
that resolution’.38 It follows that ‘any judgment given by the Community measure 
intended to give effect to such a resolution is contrary to a higher rule of law in 
the Community legal order would not entail any challenge to the primacy of that 
resolution in international law’. 39  The ECJ then takes the seemingly 
straightforward step of determining that the regulation violates Mr Kadi’s rights 
of defence (including his right to be heard and right to effective judicial 
protection) and his right to respect for property, and holds the regulation must 
be annulled. 
 
Of course, no legal order is an island, particularly in an era of multi-level 
governance. There is a sense even in the judgment that the ECJ is aware that it is 
pedaling in fiction by drawing this hermetic separation between international 
and EU legal orders. Though it insists that it is merely reviewing the 
implementation of Security Council measures by EU institutions, it does engage 
in a brief review of the structures and procedures at the UN level to ascertain 
whether they satisfy EU standards. The ECJ finds that, with respect to the ‘system 
of restrictive measures set up by the United Nations with regard both to entry in 
the summary list and to removal from it’, namely the focal point, ‘the fact 
remains that the procedure before [the Sanctions Committee]’ is still in essence 
diplomatic and inter-governmental, the persons or entities concerned having no 
real opportunity of asserting their rights and that committee taking its decisions 
by consensus, each of its members having a right of veto’.40  
 
Moreover, the ECJ acknowledges that any judgment it hands down will have 
effect beyond the EU legal order. As the ECJ could not help but be aware, the 
effect of the annulment of the EU regulation would be to place EU members in 
breach of their obligations under the UN Charter, and moreover to open an EU-
sized hole in the sanctions net. The UN Security Council regime is particularly 
sensitive to state violations as funds that would otherwise be frozen can be 
channeled into the breach. Accordingly, we find the ECJ building in qualifications 
to its claims to legal autonomy. Somewhat undermining its insistence that review 
of the regulation would not entail any challenge to the primacy of the Security 
Council resolution, the ECJ acknowledges that the annulment will have the effect 
of ‘seriously and irreversibly prejudicing the effectiveness of the restrictive 
measures imposed by the regulation. As such, the ECJ builds in a three-month 
suspension of the effects of the judgment to give the relevant European 
institutions time to remedy the infringements.41 
 
                                                        
38
 ECJ Kadi, [278] (my emphasis). 
39
 ECJ Kadi, [288]. 
40
 ECJ Kadi, [320], [323]. 
41
 ECJ Kadi, [373]-[376]. 
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(b) Reaction and Analysis: Between Dualism, Dialogue and Dissent 
In terms of its approach to the relationship between European and international 
legal orders, the judgment has attracted mixed reviews and has been the subject 
of a range of different interpretations. In her seminal and influential article, 
Gráinne de Búrca was critical of the ECJ’s approach to the relationship between 
legal orders on the basis it ‘[eschews] engagement in the kind of international 
dialogue that has generally been presented as one of the EU’s strengths as a 
global actor’ and determines the relationship between the EU and the 
international order ‘in accordance with its own internal values and priorities 
rather than in accordance with any common principles or norms of international 
law’.42 The judgment has been said to insert itself in a tradition of nationalism, 
taking the path of ‘European particularism’.43 Kunoy and Dawes invoke criticism 
of the ECJ perspective as ‘solipsistic’, ‘imperialistic’ and smacking of ‘European 
self-centredeness’. 44 From a practical perspective, the Security Council’s 
Monitoring Team expressed concern that decisions such as Kadi have placed the 
sanctions regime ‘at a crossroads’ and could have a ‘significant impact on the 
regime’ jeopardizing the implementation of sanctions by member states with the 
‘potential to damage the regime or to distract it from looking forward’.45  
 
Other scholars argue that the judgment was not as starkly exceptionalist or 
isolationist as has been made out. Certain scholars have argued that the 
judgment in ECJ Kadi should be interpreted as the ‘global governance’ equivalent 
of the celebrated Solange decision by the German Bundesverfassungericht.46 
Parallels between the set of circumstances leading to the adoption of the Solange 
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decision and the present power negotiation in the global context are not difficult 
to draw. As will be recalled, in the 1960s and 1970s, the ever-expanding remit of 
EC law and the ECJ’s claim to be its supreme interpreter of the law made Member 
States’ constitutional courts particularly uneasy about what they perceived to be 
the lack of effective protection for basic rights at the EC level. In the absence of 
provisions of basic rights in the European Treaties, the Community’s sphere of 
operation increasingly resembled a ‘gaping fundamental rights loophole’.47 In 
response, in a 1974 decision which has come to be known as Solange I, the 
German Bundesverfassungericht reserved for German courts the right to review 
EC acts for their conformity with German Constitution ‘as long as the integration 
process has not progressed so far that Community law [recognises] a catalogue 
of fundamental rights…, which is adequate in comparison with the catalogue of 
fundamental rights contained in the German constitution’.48 In the 1986 decision 
that has become known as Solange II, the Bundesverfassungericht satisfied itself 
with the EC’s general standard of rights protection and declared that it would 
refrain from reviewing Community measures as long as that general standard 
was kept up.49 
 
As noted above, the ECJ does give a nod to the Solange line of reasoning, 
measuring UN procedures against EU standards.50 However, it requires some 
distortion of the reasoning of the ECJ to argue that it goes so far as adopting the 
Solange approach. Problematically, the ECJ jettisons an important element of the 
Solange method: it is important to recall that the dissociative logic of the Solange 
decisions was counterbalanced by a crucial dialogic element.51 In ECJ Kadi, the 
Court made no attempt to enter into a dialogue with the Security Council. Unlike 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the Solange judgments, the Court in ECJ Kadi was 
not interested in exploring a ‘mutually disciplining logic’ between the two legal 
systems in question. It declined to enter into any consideration as to whether the 
conflict between the legal orders could be resolved by reference to a basic set of 
rights standards common to both the Community and the UN Charter. Rather, it 
rebukes the CFI for measuring the sanctions regime against jus cogens norms52 
and emphasises that it is concerned with the compatibility of the regulation with 
‘principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms enshrined in Article 6(1) EU as a foundation of the Union’.53  
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My own view is that it is unwise to try to draw an enduring normative test from 
ECJ Kadi judgment. Insofar as the judgment reflects ‘dualist’ reasoning, it would 
be a retrograde step to accept ECJ Kadi as a precedent for this disassociation of 
domestic implementing measures from international measures. At the same 
time, to interpret the ECJ as promoting a Solange equivalence approach requires 
too much distortion of the language of the judgment. Instead, my view is that we 
need to appreciate the judgment in its political context as more in the nature of 
an act of open judicial revolt against years of fruitless political dialogue. Türküler 
Isiksel invites us to see the ECJ’s judgment in ECJ Kadi in its broader political 
context as ‘an act of civil disobedience’ rendered necessary by the UN Security 
Council’s misapplication of foundational principles of the international order.54 
She argues (and I agree) that the ECJ’s evasiveness towards international law in 
Kadi should not be regarded as lawless unilateralism, but as the fulfillment of its 
role to uphold the rule of law both within the EU and within the international 
legal order.55 I have argued elsewhere that the judicial role needs to be 
recalibrated where courts are engaged in the review of international decision-
making. 56  In this respect, there should be greater acceptance and 
acknowledgement by courts that, when asked to review international decision-
making, they are providing legal counsel, though in a wider political forum.  
 
In conclusion, from a pragmatic perspective, the effect of the ‘disruptive’ ECJ Kadi 
decision was to strengthen the role and relevance of the ECJ,57 and also 
paradoxically to heighten the power and influence of the Security Council. By 
giving voice to its sharpest critics, here the ECJ, the Security Council did not in 
fact threaten compliance with its decision-making but arguably enhanced its 
reach and relevance. The Security Council’s measured response to the decision, 
chiefly the introduction of the Office of the UN Ombudsperson, served to 
strengthen the intelligence and legitimacy of decisions made. Yet, from a 
normative perspective, I argue that the approach adopted in ECJ Kadi is best 
interpreted as an exceptionally interventionist approach. The ECJ’s failure to 
engage in any form of dialogue or negotiation of standards by reference to the 
broader decision-making context is justifiable only if this judgment is seen as an 
‘act of civil disobedience’ responding to the fact that the gap between what was 
legal and what was legitimate had become too wide, as perceived by those bound 
by the UN sanctions regime. The problem is that, in Kadi II, to be discussed in the 
next section, the CJEU made the mistake of transforming the exception, a 
justifiable act of rebellion, into the rule.  
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IV. KADI IN THE CJEU: 
SUBSIDIARITY AND THE STUMBLING BLOCK OF EFFECTIVENESS 
 
In Kadi II, the CJEU heard an appeal from a decision of the CFI (by then known as 
the General Court) in which the General Court applied the reasoning of the 2008 
ECJ decision to annul the regulation enacted to replace the regulation annulled in 
ECJ Kadi.58 In the General Court’s decision, sharp notes of reluctance throughout 
the judgment indicate that the General Court’s application of ECJ Kadi should not 
be mistaken for harmony between the courts on the issue. With clear regret, the 
General Court states that ‘it falls not to [the General Court], but to the Court of 
Justice to reverse the precedent’,59 and professes a compulsion (rather than a 
willingness) to accept the task the ECJ had spelled out for it, namely to ensure ‘in 
principle the full review of the lawfulness of the contested regulation in the light 
of fundamental rights, without affording the regulation any immunity from 
jurisdiction on the ground that it gives effect to resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII’.60 It is interesting that, in the following 
paragraph, the General Court expressly implants the Solange qualification that 
was not express in the ECJ judgment, adding that this review was appropriate ‘at 
the very least so long as the re-examination procedure operated by the Sanctions 
Committee clearly fails to offer the guarantees of effective judicial protection’, 
citing the Opinion of Advocate General Maduro.61  
 
(a) The Findings 
 
The European Council, Commission and the United Kingdom put forward various 
grounds in support of their respective appeals. The two most relevant grounds of 
appeal were that the Court had committed errors of law in that (1) the contested 
regulation was not recognised as having immunity from jurisdiction and (2) with 
regard to the level of intensity of judicial review. The first ground of appeal is a 
direct challenge to the ECJ judgment in ECJ Kadi. This ground of appeal received 
short shrift. The CJEU once again declined to accept the European Council’s 
invitation to restore respect for the supremacy of Security Council decision-
making. Instead, it reinforced the separation between legal orders that was the 
hallmark of the ECJ 2008 decision. The CJEU determined that ‘without the 
primacy of a Security Council resolution at the international level thereby being 
called into question’, the Court was required to implement the ‘constitutional 
guarantee’ of judicial review of the lawfulness of all EU measures, including 
those which, as in the present case, implement an international law measure, in 
light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU.62  
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The key issue on appeal was the ‘level of intensity’ of judicial review by the 
European courts. Here, the European Commission and Council, supported by all 
Member States intervening in the appeals, cautioned the CJEU against taking the 
‘excessively interventionist’ approach followed by the General Court. Yet the 
CJEU was not for turning. In a move that is difficult to reconcile with the 
disassociation between legal orders at the heart of its response to the first 
ground of appeal, the CJEU assumed a power, not merely to review, but to 
second-guess Security Council decision-making. Where an individual challenges 
the lawfulness of a listing decision in the Courts of the EU, the Court held that the 
courts had an obligation to review whether ‘rules as to procedure and rules as to 
competence, including whether or not the legal basis is adequate’ had been 
observed.63 As interpreted by the CJEU, this meant that European courts were 
not merely entitled but obliged to enter into a review of the initial decision to list 
by the Security Council Sanctions Committee As interpreted by the CJEU, this 
meant that European courts were not merely entitled but obliged to enter into a 
review of the initial decision to list by the Security Council Sanctions Committee 
‘to ensure that that decision, which affects that person individually…is taken on a 
sufficiently solid factual basis’.64  
 
In such circumstances, the relevant EU authority was under an obligation ‘to 
produce information or evidence, confidential or not, relevant to such an 
examination’. 65  The Court here gives little quarter to concerns about 
international security or confidentiality, stating that ‘the secrecy or 
confidentiality of that information or evidence is no valid objection’ before the 
Courts of the EU. The CJEU does recognise that courts have the task to apply 
‘techniques which accommodate, on the one hand, legitimate security 
considerations about the nature and sources of information taken into account in 
the adoption of the act concerned and, on the other, the need sufficiently to 
guarantee to an individual respect for his procedural rights, such as the right to 
be heard and the requirement for an adversarial process’.66 However, in 
circumstances where the relevant authorities declined to disclose information, it 
was for the courts to determine ‘whether the reasons relied on by that authority 
as grounds to preclude that disclosure are well founded’.67 If it is impossible for 
the Court to find the reasons are well founded, including presumably where it 
cannot get its hands on the relevant information, those reasons cannot be relied 
upon as the basis for the contested listing decision. Ultimately, the CJEU found 
that none of the allegations presented against Mr Kadi in the narrative summary 
provided by the Sanctions Committee justified the adoption of sanctions 
measures. In those circumstances, it confirmed the annulment of the regulation.  
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(b) Reaction and Analysis: Subsidiarity – a leap too far 
 
In Kadi II, the CJEU made the mistake of transforming the justifiable act of 
rebellion by the ECJ in ECJ Kadi into an enduring normative approach. The 
problem is not so much with the idea that Security Council decisions should be 
subject to judicial review as with the parochialism of this move. At paragraph 
131, the CJEU suggests it is seeking to ensure ‘a fair balance between the 
maintenance of international peace and security and the protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the person concerned…, those being shared 
values of the UN and the European Union’. Yet, though the CJEU purports to 
apply fundamental rights, it is clear that it makes no attempt to understand those 
rights in the global context. The values it applies are not ‘shared values’, but 
‘fundamental rights guaranteed by the European Union’.  
 
In Kadi II, the CJEU opts for something akin to a principle of subsidiarity, with the 
presumption that regional constitutional values prevail over international ones, 
even in the context of international decision-making. The effect is not to dissolve, 
but to invert the hierarchy established in the heavily-disputed 2005 CFI Kadi 
decision. Between 2005 and 2013, the arc swung 180 degrees from a recognition 
of Security Council supremacy by the CFI to a claim to judicial supremacy by the 
CJEU. There is no attempt to reconcile the two orders. The CJEU held that, while 
Security Council resolutions had primacy at the international level, they became 
subject to the primacy of constitutional guarantees of the EU when implemented 
at the European level. As such, the ‘right to effective judicial protection’ is 
interpreted as a ‘declaration from a court, by means of a judgment ordering 
annulment whereby the contested measure is retroactively erased from the legal 
order’.68 Here the CJEU applies, seemingly without reflection, a peculiarly 
domestic interpretation of due process, developed in international treaties and 
across domestic legal systems to apply to the typical domestic governmental 
context.69 Yet, as any public lawyer will readily identify, it is well established that 
due process is contextual: different legal contexts legitimately require different 
procedural standards and operate according to different principles and values.70 
While judicial review may be appropriate in a domestic legal setting, this is not 
to say it is necessary or even appropriate in the Security Council setting where 
other methods of recourse may be more appropriate. Yet there is no attempt by 
the CJEU to evaluate the Ombudsperson procedure established as a review 
process in the Security Council sanctions context. The UN Ombudsperson is not 
even mentioned in the Court’s findings. Instead, the Court merely alludes to the 
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‘improvements added’ with a fairly abrupt conclusion that ‘they do not provide 
to the person…listed…the guarantee of judicial protection’.71   
 
The danger in interpreting ‘fundamental rights’ by reference to standards 
developed for the domestic context can be appreciated if we follow through the 
Court’s reasoning in terms of effectiveness. Paradoxically, application of the right 
to ‘effective judicial protection’ in the Security Council sanctions context is 
rendered inappropriate precisely because it is ineffective. The consequence of the 
decision is to implement a system of judicial supremacy mandating judicial 
review of Security Council decision-making. In doing so, the CJEU arrogates to 
itself the duty to perform a role that it cannot effectively exercise. States, in 
particular members of the P5, will be extremely reluctant to give up information 
to a foreign court. Yet the CJEU acknowledges that, if it cannot get its hands on 
any information that supports the listing, it will be forced to annul the relevant 
sanctions measures.  
 
To appreciate the overly narrow and parochial nature of the CJEU’s reasoning, 
one need only compare review by the CJEU to review by the UN Ombudsperson. 
The Ombudsperson framework offers a number of advantages over judicial 
review, which merit detailed attention and not a cursory dismissal by the CJEU.72 
For example, the Ombudsperson has the power to engage in de novo review of 
the fairness of sanctions listings by reference to present circumstances, in 
contrast to judicial review which is frozen in time at the point of the initial 
listing. Secondly, the Ombudsperson carries out review by reference to 
contextually-appropriate and consistent standard, namely, ‘whether there is 
sufficient information to provide a reasonable and credible basis for the 
listing’.73. Third, the Ombudsperson has expertise in processing the intelligence 
information at issue, and is clearly in a far better position than international or 
domestic courts to interpret and assess the weight of information than domestic 
or international courts. 74  Finally and perhaps most significantly, the 
Ombudsperson is in a unique position to place pressure on states to gain access 
to relevant information. Certainly the limitations that exist for domestic or 
regional courts where information is not held by their municipal authorities do 
not exist for the UN Ombudsperson. Moreover, there are several factors that 
combine to give strength to requests by the Ombudsperson for access to 
confidential information upon which decisions have been based, including (1) 
her Security Council mandate;75 (2) the burden of proof where ‘any lack of detail 
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does not work to the prejudice of the petitioner’;76 (3) the triggering effect of her 
report which binds the sanctions committee unless reversed unanimously;77 and 
(4) her capacity to enter into specific arrangements with individual states to 
obtain access to confidential information.78  
 
V. THE ADVOCATES-GENERAL: 
SOLANGE EQUIVALENCE IN THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE CONTEXT 
 
In conclusion, none of the decisions by the European courts in the Kadi litigation 
produce a satisfactory normative outcome. Far from unifying a complex web of 
legal regimes in the sanctions context, this pendulum of hierarchies between 
supremacy and subsidiarity merely encourages the clash of regimes. The choice 
of frame, domestic, regional or international, determines the decision, where the 
danger is that each will seek to make its law govern the whole and to transform 
its preference into the general preference. Law and courts become part of the 
problem, not of the solution. In these circumstances, the focus of courts should 
be on mechanisms by which to achieve the accommodation between conflicting 
values and interests in international society, and not on the triumph of one set of 
institutions or norms over another. 
 
In this respect, it is worth contrasting the decisions of the European courts with 
the opinions of the Advocates General delivered to assist the judges in this 
litigation.79 Writing to assist the ECJ in ECJ Kadi, Advocate General Maduro notes 
the autonomy of the European Community legal order,80 but immediately 
qualifies this with the statement that ‘this does not mean…that the Community’s 
municipal legal order and the international legal order pass by each other like 
ships in the night’.81 The core of his approach is to encourage a form of 
continuing dialogue between legal orders, stating that ‘[i]n an increasingly 
interdependent world, different legal orders will have to endeavour to 
accommodate each other’s jurisdictional claims’.82  He was firm that ‘courts 
ought not to be institutionally blind’, could not always claim a monopoly on 
determining how certain fundamental interests should be reconciled and should, 
where possible, recognise the authority of institutions, such as the Security 
Council, that were sometimes better placed to weigh those fundamental 
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interests.83 It was Advocate General Maduro, rather than the ECJ itself, that 
proposed the application of an equivalence principle such as that applied in the 
famous Solange case,84 promising respect for the primacy of Security Council 
resolutions on the condition that fundamental rights benefited from an 
equivalent degree of protection at the international level.85 The flip-side was 
that, where the test of equivalence was not met, the Advocate General 
maintained the right to invalidate EU mechanisms giving effect to Security 
Council resolutions, and indeed resolved in his Opinion that the relevant 
regulation should be annulled in the case before the Court.86 
 
Advocate General Bot picked up where Advocate General Maduro left off in his 
Opinion delivered prior to the CJEU decision. In his opinion in Kadi II on the 
extent and intensity of review, Advocate General Bot emphasised the need to 
take account of the origin and context of the EU act it is reviewing. In particular, 
he noted the need to recognise ‘the fact that inclusion on the list is decided on 
the basis of a centralised, universal procedure at the level of the United Nations 
or that such a decision is based on a summary of reasons drawn up by the 
Sanctions Committee on the basis of information or evidence which is provided 
to it by the State(s) which made the listing request, in most cases in confidence, 
and which is not intended to be made available to the EU institutions’.87 
Advocate General Bot paid express attention to the improvements introduced 
following ECJ Kadi, in particular the establishment of the Office of the UN 
Ombudsperson. He recognised that ‘[t]his process reflects a realization within 
the United Nations that, despite confidentiality requirements, the listing and 
delisting procedures must now be implemented on the basis of a sufficient level 
of information, that the communication of that information to the person 
concerned must be encouraged, and that the statement of reasons must be 
adequately substantiated’.88 He held that the Ombudsperson helped to guarantee 
that listings are based on sufficiently serious evidence and recognised that 
‘excessively high regional or national requirements could, in truth, prove to be 
counterproductive’ if states were ‘less inclined in future to transmit confidential 
information to the Sanctions Committee’.89 While emphasizing that the solution 
was not to give carte blanche to the Security Council, he advocated a position of 
‘mutual confidence and effective collaboration’, arguing that ‘an effective global 
fight against terrorism requires confidence and collaboration between the 
participating international, regional and national institutions, rather than 
mistrust’.90 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Both the Security Council and courts are faced with the difficult task of 
negotiating (albeit indirectly) principles to determine the extent to which they 
should claim and cede power. In this note, I have argued that the Security Council 
would be unwise to discount or rebuff the ‘invitation’ by the ECJ in Kadi to share 
decision-making authority. It is not enough for the Security Council to rely on 
formal legality and supremacy to achieve compliance with its commands. The 
general cloud of suspicion over international institutions and international law 
more generally based on a perceived lack of accountability or ‘democratic deficit’ 
can be attenuated where domestic or regional institutions with closer links to 
citizen participation and concerns are built into the decision-making process.91 
Moreover, domestic and regional courts can play an important role in translating 
fundamental domestic or regional values to the international context.92 These 
hybrid national/international norms will serve to feed into a broader dialogue 
about applicable principles. This in turn will serve to lend greater legitimacy to 
decision-making in accordance with these principles both from an international 
and domestic perspective, through a process of ‘particularization and 
justification’ of fundamental values in the context of global governance.93 
In this respect, the Security Council should recognise the capacity to increase its 
power and influence by enlisting (or even merely tolerating) the involvement of 
domestic and regional institutions. The essence of power-sharing is that it does 
not simply dilute, but can strengthen the effectiveness and legitimacy of legal 
authority by permitting a more efficient distribution and organization of 
governmental functions, and increasing the acceptability of decision-making. Yet 
European courts also need to recognise that there are limits to this power-
sharing arrangement. The standards of effectiveness and legitimacy provide both 
a rationale but also a limitation to power-sharing where it does not advance 
either of these goals. Domestic and regional institutions should be careful not to 
assume excessive authority in decision-making about matters of international 
peace and security. Such institutions have the potential to raise rather than 
reduce legitimacy concerns where they impose unreasonable burdens on the 
international legal order. Moreover, it is not sufficient for questions of 
international significance to be decided according to national or regional 
constitutional principles, which after all reflect values and interests of national 
or regional constituents. Questions of legal authority have to be discussed in a 
way that takes into account the structural connections between national and 
international law. Principles for the allocation of decision-making authority 
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about international peace and security must be conceived within a cosmopolitan, 
not a national or regional frame.94 
In considering legal techniques for the allocation of authority, our focus should 
not be on formalistic or structural techniques such as supremacy (which 
provides disproportionate power to international institutions) or subsidiarity 
(which provides disproportionate power to domestic or regional institutions), 
but on the deeper normative goals of enhancing the community acceptability and 
efficacy of decision-making. In the context under discussion in this article, both 
Council and courts are walking a tightrope as to the extent to which they should 
claim and cede power. Over-claiming by the Security Council will reduce the 
legitimacy of its decision-making, while over-claiming by domestic or regional 
institutions has the capacity to reduce the effectiveness of decision-making about 
international peace and security. Appropriately configured principles for power-
sharing should not be regarded as unwelcome constraints. Instead, they should 
be recognised as both balancing prop and safety net that will ultimately enhance 
the power, effectiveness and influence of Security Council and courts alike.  
 
                                                        
94 M. Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship  between 
Constitutionalism in and beyond the State’ in J. Dunoff and J. Trachtman, Ruling the World? 
Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press 2009). 
